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1. I would like to begin by expressing the great satisfaction 
which your presence here affords both to ILPËS and to me 
personally. I would particularly like to thank those of you from 
outside the region who so kindly and promptly accepted the 
Invitation extended by UNDP and ILPES to come and to meet with 
us. My thanks also go to Hugo Navajas Mogro, Director of the 
UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, for Its 
sponsorship of the meeting. Special acknowledge Is due to Dr. 
César Ml quel , Director of the UNDP Regional Programme, whose 
sensitivity to the problems of the public sector In the reglori 
was a decisive factor In making this meeting possible. I am also 
grateful to Dr.Norberto González and to all the ECLAC specialists 
gathered here for their support. 
2. Mankind has moved from one century to the next, yet within 
the same millennium, for many, many years now (this Is certainly 
no great revelation, of coursel). Fourteen years from now, 
however, we will be on the threshold of both a new century and a 
new millennium. Although manklnd"s evolution cannot be explained 
by reference to any such formal construct as the Gregorian 
Calendar, this changeover will symbolize a major turning point In 
history. Its approach moves us to reflect upon the future. This 
meeting Is being held In recognition of this prospect. Even 
though Its agenda contains topics of more immediate Interest, the 
concerns discussed In the Initial sections relate to probable 
paths which planning should take between now and the end of the 
decade. 
3. Both UNDP and ILPES are Interested In programming their 
activities within a multi-annual time frame which will take in 
the early years of the 1990s. Although both organizations are 
—by their very terms of reference— "actlon-orlented", they 
cannot dispense with at least a modicum of reflection about the 
future If they wish to ensure greater consistency as regards 
their multilateral co-operation with the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. This process of reflection will be 
more effective If It can be made more collective and pluralistic. 
This meeting is bringing together some of the thinkers, from 
outside the region, who are helping to push back the frontiers of 
knowledge within their specializations; the main actors in the 
public or private sectors of the region itself whose decisions 
will help shape the future, and the experts from within the 
United Nations system whose duty It is to co-operate with the 
countries In their quest for development. This Is the overall 
purpose of this meeting. 
4. In view of the fact that planning will be highly necessary 
within our market economies in the near future, the Instituted 
maintains that a reformulation of the theoretical, methodological 
and practical aspects of planning is called for. There are two 
variants of this hypothesis: the firts is that planning must 
either be reformulated or It will die. The second, more radical 
one, Is that planning must either be reformulated or It cannot be 
revived. 
5. Of course, planners are far from being the only (or even, 
necessarily, the main) source of support for our Governments as 
they move towards higher levels of excellence. Specifically, a 
parallel reformulation of government services will be essential; 
this is a subject which I will not touch upon again, however, 
since It goes beyond the scope of the agenda for this meeting. 
In any case, planners and government administrators will have to 
share In this task If they hope to eliminate many of the flaws 
which can now be seen In the exercise of government. Michael 
Kir by —who was, at the last moment, unable to accompany us 
here— cites, Inter alia, the following defects: 
- Dealing with problems in isolation from one another and thus 
exacerbating them; 
- Seeking short-term solutions and thereby creating greater 
future difficulties; 
- Basing action on a static understanding of the problems 
Involved. 
6. If planning Is to assist governments in improving their 
performance, then it must be tied in with the real process of 
economic, social and political development; planning methods must 
incorporate the new perceptions of this process which science has 
given us; planning praxis must be open to Interaction with the 
vatlous social actors, as well as playing a role In major 
decisions concerning short-term economic policy, by facilitating 
It and ensuring Its consistency and continuity. In rough 
outline, these are the four central ideas being raised at this 
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meeting. I would like to take a moment to expand upon these 
ideas, session by session, by adding a few remarks to the 
observations which the Institute has already presented in another 
document and which I will not repeat here» */ 
I. FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT 
7. The first aspect relates to the body of theory available for 
use in interpreting development, to its ability to reflect the 
more recent changes that have taken place in the international 
economy and, especially, to its adequacy in anticipating possible 
scenarios towards which the countries of this region may evolve. 
This has two implications: one is that planning, when divorced 
from a development strategy, is an unproductive exercise; and it 
is not my intention to evaluate the present status of development 
theory, nor to suggest that the first session of this meeting 
should be devoted to such an assessment. 
8. I do, however, wish to touch upon three main considerations, 
albeit briefly. Firstly, a number of thorough-going changes in 
scientific thought which have occurred during the second half of 
this century have not been fully absorbed by the science of 
economics. I am referring to two such changes, in particular, 
which have a direct bearing on planning: on the one hand, 
economics has not grown sufficiently away from its mechanistic 
legacy, which prompts it to cling to the false assumption that 
predictable cause-and-effect relationships exist among the 
phenomena it studies; on the other hand, it continues to be 
infected with a desire to find elements of stability, order or 
balance within economic dynamics. I hope to return to this point 
later on. 
*/ Part IV of this document should be considered within a 
dual context: the background information presented by ILPES at 
this Colloquium (see Doc. NTl/D 3) and the agenda for the final 
panel (see Doc. NTI/D 3, fourth meeting). The other sections 
have a more Independent basis. 
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9. Secondly, economics has also failed to fully assimilate 
major changes which have occurred more recently within its own 
field of study; this reduces the credibility of any development 
scenarios It may construct. I will confine myself to just four 
of these changes here. One : The link between science and 
technology and industry has never before been as close as it is 
now, and this link creates a need for an Internalization of 
production, without which the high cost of Innovation cannot be 
borne. One Implication of this Is that Inputs of knowledge have 
taken on a greater Importance In the production process; this has 
an effect on labour relations and on the dynamics of capital 
formation. 
10. Two: This phenoraen has caused the mayor enterprises at the 
world level to change their strategy by undertaking a more rapid 
differentiation of products and extending the markets in which 
they are sold as a way of maximizing profits and by exercising 
greater control over Inputs of knowledge as a means of reducing 
future risks. These two courses of action are associated with a 
"proliferation of variety" In the various stages of production 
and with the Increased importance of services as new and central 
elements In these same stages. 
Three : Technical progress is not determined solely by the 
rate of fixed capital formation. Nonetheless, there is a lack of 
theoretical knowledge about how Industrial capital is articulated 
(at either the International or national level) with other types 
of capital, particularly financial and commercial capital. 
12. Four : We lack a comprehensive explanation of the process of 
economic dynamics within a situation of mounting International 
Interdependence » Present analyses are, as a result, less useful 
means of anticipating future scenarios as regards these dynamics. 
This factor fits In with the slowness shown by the prevailing 
school of economic thought In resolutely seeking a new 
understanding of time and, thus, In following In the footsteps of 
other sciences» Naturally, It therefore falls to comprehend that 
the "Internal time" of the developed countries Is different from 
the "Internal time" of the underdeveloped countries, and this 
asynchrony Is also a significant factor In the other aspects of 
the asymmetrical relations between the two. Consequently, we 
wl.ll have to "re-think" development in order to see it as an 
essentially unstable process In which the future Is Invariably 
distinct from the pa.st and will have to try to envisage new 
organizational patterns within the dynamics of this divergence. 
13. The third consideration concerning the difficulty of 
anticipating future scenarios relates more properly to this 
region, and I wish to do no more here than to point it out» If 
the futurology now being practiced to- Latiii America and the 
Caribbean is to attain even a minimal degree of realism, it must 
include specific national features in the picture of £he.region 
which it forms. With each passing day, this region Is becoming a 
more heterogeneous subject of research for economic analysts or, 
In more general terms, for social scientists. 
14. In developing the thoughts I wish to share with you at this 
opening meeting, I should warn you that my remarks here are not 
intended to serve as rigid guidelines for the discussion. All I 
wish to do Is to make some comments that will servg as a backdrop 
for my remarks concerning the other topics. We are extremely 
grateful for the work of Dr. Van Arkadle, which establishes a 
thought-provoking bridge between the spheres of development and 
planning that will pave the way for the initial discussions to be 
held at this meeting. I would also like to thank Dr. Linstone 
for setting forth a variety of planning perspectives which will 
certainly make an important contribution to the discussions in 
which we will all participate. Finally, Dr. René Villarreal will 
bring his customary brilliance to bear on the subject of 
paradigms for development. 
15. In order to keep to the main thesis, which relates to the 
relevance of planning in mixed economies, I would like to 
advance one more idea before going on to the topics which follow. 
If we accept the idea that planning involves stressing a given 
"direction" in the possible future course of a national system, 
then the facts which I have pointed out here attest to the 
necessity of doing so —a need which would not exist if we were 
Indifferent about the future. Finally, given the open and 
Indeterminate nature of the future, we would be 111 advised to 
attempt to envision it on the basis of theories which do not take 
account of historic time, which relegate society to the "common 
grave" of "ceteris paribus" or which convert the construction of 
scenarios into nothing more than an exercise of mathematical 
logic or statistical determinism. This brings us to the topics 
of the second session. 
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II. METHODS COMPATIBLE WITH A NEW PERCEPTION 
16. I have already mentioned four phenomena within the field of 
economics which I feel have not been properly incorporated at the 
theoretical level. I would like to review these points very 
briefly here as a means of explaining why I speak of the need for 
a new perception at the methodological level. I have already 
said, although not in so many words, that the potential for 
Industrialization serves as the main criterion for the allocation 
of resources to science and technology at the world level. I 
might add that this underlies the present dynamics of 
development, and would also note that the differentiation of 
products and processes, on the one hand, and the predominance of 
services in production activities, on the other hand, have 
entailed a runaway increase in the variety of stages of 
production and of the specialization of labour. Furthermore, the 
rapid pace of technical progress also stems from a new type of 
articulation among the various spheres of capital. Finally, It 
should be noted that development is an unstable process whose 
outcome is undetermined. 
17. Now, these four factors invariably give rise to a 
characterization of development as a highly and increasingly 
complex process. This is a decisive factor if any useful 
reformulation of planning methodology is to be accomplished which 
will enable it to help each society to choose and stress one 
among all the possible future directions for its own development 
process, and it may increase its ability to move in its chosen 
direction. 
18. The greater external interdependence of each nation's 
economy, the spread of markets, technical changes in goods and 
production processes, and increasing specialization are some of 
the other facets of relatively recent phenomena which are giving 
rise to a "proliferation of variety" in national systems, i.e., 
an Increase in the variables and dimensions to be considered in 
conducting analyses or making projections and8 at the same time, an increase in the linear and non-linear relations involved in 
the network of their interlinkages. If economic analysis is to 
move towards this new kind of perception, it will gradually have 
to abandon its deterministic legacy. 
19. In other words, it will require some sort of a break with a 
long tradition of reductionism. As Stafford Beer pointed out, we 
must not try to deal with complexity by eliminating this 
"proliferation of variety". A new way of perceiving time, as 
already described, will also be required, and this must be based 
on an understanding that the evolution of social processes 
contains a component of inertia, which tends to repeat the past, 
and a component of chance, in which man's adaptability and 
creativity play a part. 
20. In this day and age, planning involves the exercise of a 
certain degree of directionality over the states of a national 
system in an uncertain future; one of the richest experiences in 
this field has been provided by Dr. Dubois. In addition, in the 
tradition of these previous studies, Dr. Ingelstam has made a 
number of important contributions: one of the more outstanding 
ones is that long-term planning should Involve an approach which 
provides a situational focus. During the course of the same 
session, Dr. Holland provided a highly up-to-date assessment of a 
variety of European experiences In planning which Dr. Kogane 
related to the Interesting experience of Japan. 
21. Returning to our central thesis, the considerations which 
have just been discussed suggest the existence of a specific 
space for planning within our market economies. On the one hand, 
the Increasing specialization and variety of new processes and 
products require a degree of co-ordination which the market 
Itself Is unable to provide. On the other hand, the irreducible 
complexity of an economic system requires that its future states 
be approached primarily from a stochastic angle, which focuses on 
the system itself as well as Its interdependence with the 
surrounding environment, since the market is unable to 
effectively Indicate what these alternatives are, particularly if 
It Is necessary to distinguish between them within a givé time 
f rame. 
III. TOWARDS LEGITIMIZED CONTROL 
22. Reasons of semantic convenience rather than an excessively 
reductionist approach perhaps explain why the above 
considerations have remained for the most part within the 
economic sphere; I shall now briefly take the opportunity to 
correct this bias. This Is at the same time partly the purpose 
of the third session, which centres on the topic of social 
agents, with the hope of providing a specific space for the 
debate to weigh up the essential technical approximations, under 
the stimulus of the above topics. 
23. It Is now my Intention to divide my presentation into two 
parts, which are naturally connected: the first contains a small 
number of observations with regard to governablllty and control, 
without encroaching upon the many proposals which Professor Dror 
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intends to set before us in this respect; the second is intended 
to identify a number of positions regarding the topic of 
participation with which ILPES has concerned itself, and also 
takes Its inspiration from the teaching of Dr. Wolf, who will be 
responsible for the main presentation of this topic in the course 
of the third session. 
24. I should like to begin by stating a relationship with which 
we are all fully conversant: this is that the perception of 
complexity goes hand in hand with the problem of governability, 
at least within the terms in which the problem is nowadays posed 
in our societies. In fact, the conceptual assumption that a 
national system behaves as a complex process which Is of course 
both dynamic, multlvarious and at the final reckoning open, at 
the same time raises the problem of its self—regulation. 
25. 1 shall at this point make three brief observations in this 
respect. The first, 1s that it Is possible to observe a certain 
loss of governability within the International system, at least 
as far as economic matters are concerned. In this respect, ILPES 
has on more than one occasion insisted that part of the 
structural nature of the world crisis in the 1980s is the result 
of a weakening of the mechanisms for monetary, financial and 
trade self-regulation set up forty years ago. 
26. The second, 1s that the interdependence of each national 
system with its surrounding environment renders the task of 
attaining satisfactory domestic levels of governability even more 
complex and vulnerable. There are strong indications that the 
degree of autonomy which governments enjoy In Implementing public 
policies has declined, be they economic or social policies. 
Moreover, the external crisis has domestic repercussions, 
obliging governments to adopt highly unpopular austerity 
policies. When social forces are better organized to demand 
concrete improvements, this Interdependence then leads to a 
resurgence of discontent with the consequent risk of political 
instability. 
27. The third observation concerns the low level of government 
efficiency. In this respect, T sha I I take the opportunity to 
remind my audience of one of the theses put forward by Kenneth 
Bouldlng, who is unfortunately unable to be present with us 
today. Acknowledging the above-mentioned differentiation between 
products, he has suggested that this lias been facilitated by 
efficient communication between natural scientists and the 
engineer!ng/productive sector; as its counterpart, he states that 
government praxis Improves little, as a result of Inadequate 
communication between social scientists and those who hold the 
reins of power, although he points out that academic 
communication must not always be assumed to be correct. 
The inference made by Bouldlng Is that, at the present time, the 
structure of political power Is at presënt such that 
unsatisfactory decisions are taken. He concludes by indicating 
that the greater the degree of power, the greater the possibility 
of making erroneous decisions may be. 
28. These two observations regarding the level of government 
performance provide grist for the mill of those who hold that 
there Is a trend towards dissatisfaction involving risks for 
governablllty. Michael Kirby refers to this as the risk of 
sacrificing freedom for the sake of efficiency. However, as a 
recent UNDP document puts it, ungovernability is used as an 
excuse for authoritarian responses. However, this leads us to 
the second part of the remarks I wished to make with regard to 
participation, which is again a topic for the third session. 
29. In line with the need to change our perception in order to 
integrate the notion of the complexity of the social system it is 
vitally necessary to change the concept of control. No one is 
capable of justifying anarchy in social change; however, viewed 
from the angle of complexity, Its order will take shape within a 
dynamic of non-equillbrlum and dispersion. Coercive control may 
prove capable of Imposing temporary stability, but this will be 
disconnected from the rapid rate of historical change. The new 
concept of control should take Its Inspiration from the notion of 
self-regulation, under which the management of a complex social 
system is precisely the end result of respect for the relative 
autonomy of its subsystem. It is consequently also the outcome 
of a long process of social apprenticeship based on tolerance and 
on participation. 
30. From this viewpoint, It should be realized that 
governablllty may well be enhanced provided that a decision Is 
taken to limit the concentration of power in order to provide a 
broader basis for Its social legitimacy. This is the very basis 
for Wolf's thesis concerning participation, which includes the 
proposition that participation remains mere rhetoric if it is not 
accompanied by a real distribution of power. It Is for these 
very same reasons that ILPES has laid such stress on the topic of 
decentralization, promoting the autonomy of regional populations 
and Intensifying the level of social solidarity. 
31. As during previous sessions, I shall take this opportunity 
to reiterate the fundamental thesis which the Institute has set 
before this distinguished meeting: that there is an absolute need 
for planning, even In societies in which decision-making is 
decentralized. With regard to the features last considered, three 
further arguments provide support for this thesis. Firstly, In 
order to raise the level of governablllty, planning is necessary 
In order to contribute to political rationality by providing it 
elements of technical rationality, as was asserted in the UNDP 
report mentioned above. Secondly, in order to facilitate 
participation, planning may help to improve the performance of 
the State, since there is virtually no likelihood of the latter 
deconcentratlng Its activity within a context of social dis-
content. Thirdly, both objectives —i.e., the ability to govern 
and participation— will be furthered if planning takes into 
consideration the multiple frames of reference of the agents 
which, from within and from whithout, affect the development of 
each national system. 
IV. TODAY'S VULNERABILITY DIVERTS ATTENTION FROM THE FUTURE 
32. I shall attempt to be as brief as possible in referring to 
the fourth and final session, which is the responsibility of 
senior officials and representatives of the public and private 
sectors. It Is possible for me to be brief since the Institute 
—in its capacity as a multilateral body devoted to directly 
serving governments— has already dealt more specifically with 
these topics in a number of earlier documents, including the 
document distributed at this meeting. Neither do I intend to 
refer to each of the planned topics Individually. 
33. However, I do wish to return to the issue of complexity, 
with international relations in mind. Within this context, there 
is a considerable risk of the region becoming immersed in a new 
form of associate dependency. On the one hand, this is due 
to the new patterns of technological change and 
Internationalization of services, aggravated, on the other hand, 
by the distorted dynamics of external Indebtedness. I only wish 
to emphasize that within the framework of this very same 
asymmetric Interdependency, fascination with the Incorporation of 
new technologies —when they are not associated with a national 
development project— will ultimately worsen our structural 
heterogeneity and deepen the marglnallzatIon of considerable 
sectors of the population. These convictions have led ILPES to 
Insist —at the recent meetings of Ministers and Heads of 
Planning— on the thesis that the design of new strategies for 
reactivation and development requires, beforehand, a lasting 
solution to the critical external problems facing the region. 
I would now like to make some observations which can only be 
properly understood in the light of the agenda for the fourth 
session. 
34. With regard to the domestic sphere, I have just two remarks 
to make. Firstly, concerning an economic aspect, is that the 
need for austerity in governmental praxis, at least for the rest 
of the decade, should be recognized even though it must also be 
acknowledge that the enormous size of any government deficits is 
often brought about by the internal repercussions of the external 
debt, and consequently there is no case for drastic cutbacks in 
fiscal expenditure. Secondly, with regard to a social aspect, it 
is acknowledged that it is important to reinforce the 
compensatory role of the State and to show approval for the 
generous efforts made to eliminate pockets of critical poverty. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to avoid the development of a type 
of Malthusian dynamics, within which funds devoted to dealing 
with critical poverty follow an arithmetic progression, while the 
number of critical poor grows geometrically. Both of these 
aspects seem to represent key factors among the options for new 
strategies for reactivation and development. 
35. It is almost superfluous to insist that within our mixed 
economies every single strategy for reactivation or development 
necessarily casts private initiative in a leading role. 
Virtually every possible strategy requires that the region be 
far more present on the external market; competitiveness in this 
sphere is crucially dependent upon the growth of productivity, 
and in our mixed economies, private enterprise plays a vital role 
in this growth. In these economies, greater possibilities of 
earnings foster a rise in productivity; in such cases, no shame 
can be attached to planning for considering earnings as 
legitimate and as a tool for promoting development. 
36. In order to draw my observations to a close, I shall rapidly 
set out the final arguments —which are by no means systematic— 
in support of our central thesis. I am convinced that the use of 
planning in our mixed economies is also justified from the 
viewpoint of the essentially conjunctural preoccupations which 
will predominate in the fourth and final debate of this meeting. 
It follows from my above remarks that, firstly, planning is 
capable of playing an irreplaceable role in clarifying national 
development projects capable of organizing —in a socially and 
politically useful direction— the absorption of new 
technologies; secondly, that It should provide governments with 
assistance in rationalizing resource allocation in this crisis 
period, thereby minimizing the adoption of recessionary measures; 
thirdly, that it is capable of collaborating in providing 
alternatives for development strategies which will help to reduce 
rather than to increase the size of the marginal population, and, 
fourthly, that within the framework of a policy designed to 
conquer a greater share of the International market, planning 
must help to optimize the competitiveness of private enterprise. 
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37. There are a number of admittedly scattered final remarks 
which I have considered worthwlle making in connection with the 
debate to take place during this meeting. The mere juxtaposition 
of the subtitles chosen provides a brief summary of this 
contribution: firstly, there are debatable features in the way in 
which the available analysis of development at present operates; 
secondly, planning methods should evolve so as to incorporate a 
new awareness of complexity; thirdly, our national systems should 
evolve towards forms of control which presuppose legitimacy, and, 
fourthly, the vulnerability resulting from the crisis should not 
divert our attention from the future. It Is my conviction that 
planning has a role to play In each of these four dimensions. 
38. Moreover, these dimensions are Interconnected, In so far as 
It would be unrealistic to deal In isolation with theoretical, 
methodological, sociological and praxiological aspects linked to 
planning In mixed economies. In the near future, however, it is 
likely that planning will continue to attempt to play its role 
within a relatively hostile environment. This is in part because 
it will be difficult to achieve a consensus as to how it should 
share out its attention among its main three major tasks: 
protecting sovereignty within a framework of interdependence; 
supporting growth within a framework of extreme austerity; and 
preserving equity in the face of the predominance of new styles 
of development which lead to exclusion, 
39. All of these challenges are, moreover, projected into an 
undetermined future. Certainly, however, between the Inertia 
which reproduces the past and the element of chance —which 
Includes Innovation and creativity— there is room for political 
will to favour a particular direction within the possible 
transitional states. A renewed form of planning may prove to be 
a worthwhile Instrument in pursuing this political aim. It is in 
this sense that the future is under construction. I am firmly 
convinced that today's debate will strengthen the modest 
contribution we are able to make to that task. 


